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Abstract 
We provide non experimental evidence of the relevance of sociability on subjective wellbeing 
by investigating the determinants of life satisfaction on a large sample of Europeans aged 
above 50. We document that voluntary work, religious attendance, helping 
friends/neighbours and participation to community-related organizations affect positively 
and significantly life satisfaction. We illustrate the different impact that some sociability 
variables have on eudaimonic versus cognitive measures of subjective wellbeing. Our 
empirical findings discriminate among other regarding and self-regarding preferences as 
rationales explaining such behaviour. We document that different combinations between 
actions and motivations have different impact on life satisfaction thereby providing support 
for the relevance of these specific “contingent goods” and to the literature of procedural utility. 
Our findings are confirmed in robustness checks including refinements of the dependent 
variable, instrumental variables and sensitivity analysis on departures from the exogeneity 
assumption.  
 
Keywords: sociability, altruism, other-regarding activities, other regarding motivations, life 
satisfaction, subjective well-being. 







One of the most relevant topics in the current economic debate is the thorough discussion and 
the renewed interest on fundamentals of human preferences, after the challenge posed to the 
traditional anthropological approach of mainstream economics by the emerging articulated 
body of empirical findings in experimental economics.1 Binmore and Shaked (2010) frame the 
question by correctly arguing that this is not a problem concerning rationality and the utility 
maximizing approach since the standard theory is perfectly fit to accommodate other 
regarding arguments in its utility functions.2 The two authors defend the standard theory by 
arguing that no “selfishness axiom” appears in standard textbooks (as it sometimes seems to 
be implied, according to the same authors, by experimentalists) and that, following Samuelson, 
neoclassical theorists think it is a virtue “not to be committed to any particular view of how 
human minds work”. Back to the words of Binmore and Shaked the methodology “remains the 
same whether [players in game theory] are Attila the Hun or St. Francis of Assisi.” 
However, anytime a theoretician creates an economic model and a utility function, by 
selecting some arguments instead of others, (s)he is implicitly committing to a particular view 
of the human being. A related problem with this is that the adoption of a “reductionist” 
approach on human preferences has been widely shown to be socially harmful in presence of 
the well-known social dilemmas which typically arise in the standard framework in which 
business and social relationships occur. In presence of asymmetric information, incomplete 
contracts and limited efficiency of civil justice, coordination failures in thin market situations 
such as those depicted in prisoner’s dilemmas, trust games and traveller’s games are quite 
common. In such situations purely self-regarding attitudes produce suboptimal individual and 
social outcomes which are inferior to those generated by other regarding (i.e. team or we-
thinking) attitudes (Becchetti, 2011a). 3 
                                                        
1 We refer to evidence coming from Dictator Games (Andreoni and Miller, 2002), Ultimatum games (Güth et al., 
1982; Camerer and Thaler, 1995), Gift Exchange Games (Fehr et al., 1993; Fehr et al., 1998), Trust Games (Berg 
et al. 1995; Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2006) and Public Good Games (Fischbacher et al., 2001, Sonnemans et al., 
1999; Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Such evidence has identified fairness, inequity aversion, pure and impure 
altruism and reciprocity as some of the main departures from the purely self-regarding preference paradigm. 
2 There is obviously long tradition in considering other-regarding preferences as one of the arguments of 
individual utility even before the surge of behavioural economics. See, for instance, the literature on Ricardian 
equivalence and bequests (Leiderman and Bleier, 1988). 
3 The paradox is that even game theorists have been demonstrated as experiment participants not to follow 
standard Nash rationality but rather prefer (even in one shot simultaneous games) cooperative strategies which 
can lead to superior outcomes when facing social dilemmas (see for instance their behavior in Travellers’ Games 
in Becker et al., 2005). 
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In addition to it, modeling individuals as purely selfish is a problem since empirical evidence 
from i) donations, ii) voluntary work, iii) experiments, iv) revealed preferences of consumers 
and investors paying ethical premia and v) life satisfaction studies tells us something different.  
Official data document that around 90 percent of US citizens donated money in 2009 (for a 
total amount of $303.75 billion, around 2% of GDP) (Giving USA, 2010), while around 26 
percent volunteered by “working for nothing” in a not for profit organization.4 According to 
Gallup and OECD (2008) data the two countries with the highest share of officially 
volunteering population are Canada (38.1 percent) and Australia (37.9), while it is reasonable 
to assume that figures are much higher if we include voluntary activities performed outside 
registered not for profit organisations. The ILO has recently launched a world initiative to 
measure the impact of voluntary work by publishing a manual of accounting standards which 
should be adopted by national statistical institutes. In its introduction the manual reports that 
12 percent of the adult population of 37 main world countries (140 million people) volunteer 
(representing the equivalent of 20.8 million full-time equivalent paid workers) and generating 
a $400 billion contribution to the global economy according to conservative estimates  
(Salamon et al., 2004). More important to our investigation on life satisfaction and other 
regarding preferences is that, according to ILO, “Volunteer work provides a sense of personal 
satisfaction, fulfillment, well-being and belonging to persons who volunteer.” 
As it is well known donations and voluntary work may, in part, depend on strategic reasons 
(Andreoni, 1989 and 1990; Harbaugh, 1998; Goeree et al., 2002; Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002; see 
also Camerer, 2003, for a comprehensive review). Individuals may donate since they expect 
something back in exchange, even though, by donating they run the “social risk” of not being 
reciprocated. Another reason for donating is to gain social appraisal. Furthermore, voluntary 
work may be explained by the desire to improve one’s own social network or as a form of 
apprenticeship which may increase future employment opportunities. This is one of the 
reasons why the analysis done in this paper (which combines actions and motivations) is of 
foremost importance. All individuals in the SHARE survey are aged above 50 and therefore 
the employment motivation of other-regarding activities (i.e., for instance voluntary work) 
may be generally excluded for the large share of retired individuals in our sample. In the 
empirical analysis which follows we will consider the hypothesis of strategic reasons behind 
voluntary activity by testing whether the behavior of retired versus non-retired individuals 
differs in our sample. 
                                                        
4 http://philanthropy.com/article/26-of-Americans-Volunteer/62876/ 
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Another branch of empirical evidence which may be related to other regarding preferences is 
that of ethical premia paid by consumers on socially and environmentally responsible 
products. A recent global Survey by Nielsen on a sample of 28,000 consumers in 56 countries 
(Nielsen, 2012) calculates that 46 percent are willing to pay a premium price for companies 
adopting corporate social responsibility strategies. As is well known, even though the 
contingent evaluation literature tells us that such share falls when it comes to actual choices, 
revealed preferences on market share of products incorporating social and environmental 
premia, however, document that actual consumer behavior is affected by such willingness to 
pay.5 
 
With regard to experimental evidence, one the most systematic documentation on other 
regarding preferences is that on dictator games. A meta paper by Engels (2010) resumes 
findings from 328 different Dictator game experiments for a total of 20,813 observations and 
finds that individuals following Nash rationality (giving zero) are around one third (36 
percent). The share drops significantly once we eliminate students from the sample 6 (up to 
20 percent in case of children and 10 percent in case of middle aged players). An important 
component of other-regarding attitudes is related to the desire to maintain good relationships 
and therefore departures from the purely self regarding model are larger when social 
distance is reduced (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Broberg et al., 2005; Dana et al., 2006).7 
Overall, the experimental literature has widely documented significant departures from the 
purely self-regarding paradigm for the majority of individuals. We can therefore share Engel’s 
conclusions that “While normally a sizeable fraction of participants does indeed give nothing, as 
predicted by the payoff maximisation hypothesis, only very rarely this has been the majority 
choice. It is by now undisputed that human populations are systematically more benevolent than 
homo oeconomicus”.8 
 
                                                        
5 For a survey on the contingent claim literature see Carson et al. (2001). 
6 Additional evidence on the fact that students are significantly more selfish (more inequity averse and less 
trusting) in experiments is recently provided by Belot et al. (2010).  
7 A good synthesis on this point is provided by Konow (2010) who argues that giving arises from a mix of 
unconditional and conditional altruism where the latter is related to context dependent norms where need can 
be more important than familiarity with the receiver. 
8 Recent advancements demonstrate that results may change if the structure of the game is modified. List (2007) 
documents that individuals are more selfish when they also have the opportunity of taking and not just giving, 
even though the result that they do not choose the most selfish solution is confirmed. Furthermore, there is 
widespread evidence that they behave more selfishly when their endowments are deserved with effort or talent 
and are not a gift given by experimenters (Becchetti et al., 2011c). 
 5 
Note, however, that in their well-known controversy with behavioural economists Binmore 
and Shaked stress that lab evidence of departures from the purely self regarding paradigm 
does not imply that individuals have other regarding preferences. Their main arguments to 
confute such interpretation are that: i) when games are repeated individuals tend to converge 
toward Nash equilibria; ii) individuals are purely self regarding and maximize their utility but 
keeping into account constraints of social norms. Since departures from social norms are 
psychologically (or economically) costly they do not deviate from them. When entering in the 
lab they behave as having other regarding preferences because they believe that there is a 
social norm to apply which asks to do so (Binmore and Shaked, 2010). Hence, according to 
this view, purely self regarding preferences and Folk theorems in repeated games are enough 
to explain what observed in the lab. 
 
1.1 Contribution of our paper 
This controversy suggests that two important steps forward in this debate testing may consist 
of testing the hypothesis that other regarding behavior positively affects life satisfaction and 
discriminating between other regarding preferences and compliance to social norms as 
potential rationales for the observed other regarding behavior. This is what we try to do in 
our paper. More specifically, our assumption is that the existence of other regarding 
preferences cannot be rejected if we document that other regarding activities performed with 
other regarding motivations increase life satisfaction and are robust to changes in local social 
norms on the same activities.  
The main limit of the highly valuable experimental evidence about other regarding 
preferences is that of external consistency. What happens in labs may be quite different from 
what happens in the reality. One of the reasons is that money in lab is added to participants 
wealth while generosity in real life implies detracting resources from one’s own budget. 
Moreover most lab experiments are with students and it is therefore often wondered whether 
the same findings apply to other individuals. If, on the other side, we consider evidences 
mentioned in the introduction on voluntary work and revealed preferences on ethical premia 
paid by consumers, we observe that such evidence does not disentangle the causality problem 
of the nexus between sociability and life satisfaction. A reverse causation link may in fact not 
be ruled out since satisfaction with life may stimulate other regarding behavior. This is why it 
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is important to find also “externally consistent” non experimental evidence of other regarding 
preferences with a rigorous check of the causality link as we try to do in our paper.   
In our empirical analysis on Europeans aged above 50 we first document the significant 
positive correlation between other regarding activities and life satisfaction and its robustness 
to different measures of the dependent variable.9 We then discriminate among three plausible 
explanations of our findings, i.e. compliance to social norms, self and other regarding 
preferences. More specifically, by exploiting information on motivations behind 
voluntary/charity work and helping friends/neighbours, we find that the effect is positive and 
significant when these two actions are motivated by other regarding rationales (i.e. because 
I’m needed and/or to contribute to something useful), while it is not so in presence of non other 
regarding rationales. We then document that our main result is also robust in regions with 
high/low social norms related to the specific activity and to changes in the measure of 
subjective wellbeing. Finally, we demonstrate that the correlation is confirmed in robustness 
checks including instrumental variables and sensitivity analysis on departures from the 
exogeneity assumption.  
Hence our paper relates to the literature on subjective wellbeing and sociability. This 
literature, however, has mainly focused on the impact of social relationships on life 
satisfaction (Meier and Stutzer, 2008; Becchetti et al. 2008 and 2011b Clark and Lelkes, 
2009)10 while the contribution of our paper is on the specific focus of the correlation (and 
causality nexus) between other regarding social activities animated by other regarding 
motivations and different measures of subjective wellbeing.  
A further original feature of our work is that the “stimulus good” under our inquiry is a form 
of contingent good generated by the interaction between an action and a motivation. In this 
sense the paper both contributes to the contingent good literature and provides support to 
the procedural utility hypothesis set forth by Frey and Stutzer (2005) arguing that what 
                                                        
9 A related interesting finding in what follows is that another other regarding activity such as caring for the 
sick/elderly affects negatively our standard cognitive measure of subjective wellbeing (life satisfaction) but 
positively an eudaimonic measure of subjective wellbeing (declaration that life has a meaning). See, among 
others, Ryff and Singer (2006) for details on the concept of eudaimonic happiness.  
10 Bilancini and Sarracino (2011) document that long term changes in sociability largely predict changes in 
wellbeing in Germany, while Bartolini et al. (2012) find support for the Putnam’s (2000) “bowling alone” 
argument by showing that the decline in the US social capital (especially the intrinsically motivated component 
measured by Olson’s associations) predicts an important part of the unexplained Easterlin’s paradox in the 
1975-2004 period. 
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matters for individual utility is not just the outcome of an action but also the process and all 
its characteristics (in our case the underlying  motivations behind individual actions). 
The paper is divided into seven sections (including introduction and conclusions). In the 
second section we describe our database and illustrate the descriptive statistics of our main 
variables of interest. In the third section we outline our model specification. In section four we 
present our econometric findings and some robustness checks. In the fifth section we provide 
an in-depth analysis of our findings to discriminate among three different explanations 
(compliance to social norms, self regarding and other regarding preferences). In the sixth 
section we use instrumental variables and sensitivity analysis to document the direct 
causality nexus between other regarding activities performed with other regarding 
motivations and life satisfaction. Section seven concludes. 
 
2. Variable description and general statistics 
We use data from the second wave of SHARE implemented during 2006-2007. In Table 1 we 
report all the variables used in our analysis with a brief description. Tables 2a-2b show 
summary statistics for the main socio-demographic and economic variables under 
investigation. 
Interviewed people are asked how satisfied they are with their life on a scale from 0 to 10, 
where 0 means completely dissatisfied and 10 completely satisfied. Figure 1 shows that the 
distribution of self-reported life satisfaction (variable lifesat) in our sample is right skewed 
with a mean of 7.54 and 77.6 percent of respondents declaring a self-reported life satisfaction 
above 6. A deeper inspection of life satisfaction by country highlights that the variable mean 
takes the highest values (i.e. above eight) for Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden and Ireland in 
the order (Table 2b).   
The main variables which we consider as proxy for respondents' other regarding preferences 
are the activities carried out in the last month. More specifically, participants reply yes/no to 
the question "have you done any of these activities in the last month?" for each the following 
options: i) voluntary or charity work (variable voluntary in our sample); ii) cared for a sick or 
disabled adult (cared for sick); iii)  provided help to friends or neighbours (help to friends); iv) 
gone to a sport, social or other kind of club (sport/social clubs); v) taken part in activities of a 
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religious organization (church, synagogue, mosque etc.) (religion attendance); vi) taken part 
in a political or community-related organization (political participation).  
To provide introductory summary information on the content of these answers we create two 
variables, namely at least one activity and sociability, which can be considered respectively as 
lower and upper bound measures of other regarding preferences. The former is equal to one if 
the respondent has done at least one of the listed activities, whereas the latter is the sum of 
the activities for which the respondent replies affirmatively and is standardized by the total 
number of activities (six). 
Figure 2 and Table 2b show for each of the above-mentioned activities the overall and by-
country percentage of people participating in such activities. Considering the full SHARE 
sample composed by individuals aged above 50, almost half of the respondents declare to 
carry out at least one activity (46 percent), the most frequent one being the participation to 
sport/social clubs (20 percent), followed by helping friends (18 percent) and voluntary work 
(12 percent). When looking at the distribution of activities at the country level, we find that 
Ireland enjoys the highest score in sociability (20 percent), followed by Sweden and the 
Netherlands (19 percent), Denmark and Switzerland (18 percent). The rank is slightly 
different if we consider people carrying out at least one activity: 68 percent in Sweden, 67 
percent in Denmark and 64 percent in Ireland. Interestingly, helping friends is particularly 
frequent in Sweden (40 percent); Denmark and Switzerland perform relatively well in terms 
of social and sport clubbing (41 and 34 percent respectively), while Ireland and Greece 
outperform in terms of religion participation (34 and 28 percent).  
With respect to demographic statistics, the sample is almost perfectly balanced in terms of 
gender characteristics (females are almost 50 percent), while average schooling years are 
10.5. Half of the sample is between 50 and 60 year old. The average household size is 2.25 
(Table 2a). 
 
3. Hypothesis Testing and Model Specification 
A first set of hypotheses we want to test are i) the existence of a robust and significant 
correlation between other-regarding activities and self-declared life-satisfaction, ii) the 
improvement in terms of goodness of fit which can be obtained by introducing such 
preferences as determinants of life satisfaction. 
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The first step is to check for the presence of the above mentioned correlation by regressing 
self-declared life satisfaction on a set of variables expected to have a significant explanatory 
power according to the related literature. We are aware that correlation does not imply 
causation and of the possible endogeneity and measurement error problems affecting our 
results. In the next sections we try to address these sources of bias by using a different 
definition of life satisfaction, instrumental variable regressions and a sensitivity-to-exogeneity 
assumption analysis.  
The second step consists in comparing a baseline model of life satisfaction with the one 
augmented with proxies of other-regarding preferences. The statistics we use for this purpose 
are the R2, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC)11. Our hypothesis that the addition of other-regarding preferences to the baseline life 
satisfaction model improves the goodness of fit by increasing the R2 and reducing both the 





ijji XLifesat ε+β+α= ∑
=1          (1)
 
where Lifesat is the individual's self reported level of life satisfaction and the X variables 
include n regressors commonly used in the literature (see Table 1 for details on all the 
variables used). They include a gender dummy, years of education, household size, the 
number of children and grandchildren, dummies for marital status, age class dummies and 
dummies capturing the features of the place of residence. The SHARE database is particularly 
rich in terms of health-related questions so that we can control also for a large set of 
indicators concerning different dimensions of physical disabilities and reported illnesses. We 
group them into three variables which we use as synthetic indicators for health status, namely 
long-term illnesses, number of illnesses and limited activities. We also add a set of country 
dummies to control for country specific effects. 
                                                        
11 The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is defined as    		
   2 and the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) as    		
   , where n denotes the number of observations, k is the number of 
parameters and RSS denotes the Residual Sum of Squares. In presence of measurement error the Residual Sum of 
Squares will be higher, hence both the AIC and BIC will be higher indicating a poorer fit of the model. The 




 will be, instead, lower. 
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A very common problem faced by users of the SHARE dataset is the large number of missing 
values for income and other important variables. We consider a dataset (Christelis, 2011) 
where the missing values are imputed with the Fully Conditional Specification method (FCS) 
of Van Buuren et al. (2006)12. In brief, this method generates a distribution for the missing 
value of a given variable conditional on the non-missing values of other variables in the 
dataset. This procedure generates five imputed datasets (one for each iteration) which are 
attached to the main SHARE dataset.13 The imputed variables we use in our model are number 
of children, logincome, number of grandchildren, limited activities and the above mentioned 
dummies for the characteristics of the area of residence. For these variables, each respondent 
displays five different values but for simplicity we consider an average of them across the five 
datasets. 14 







ijji WXLifesat ε+γ+β+α= ∑∑
== 11         (2)
 
which is equal to the baseline model previously described plus a set W of m regressors 
measuring other-regarding activities. In particular, these variables are binary responses to a 
question on whether in the last month the respondent took care for a sick/disabled adult 
(caring for sick), carried out voluntary work (voluntary), religious activities (religion 
attendance), political activities (political participation) sport and social clubbing (sport/social 
clubs), helping friends or neighbours (help to friends). 
                                                        
12 The FCS method works under the missing at random (MAR) assumption according to which each variable 
missingness depends only on other variables in the system and not on the values of the variable itself. In the 
iteration process, the initial conditions of the first iteration are derived by imputing the first variable in the 
system based only on the variables that are never missing (age, gender and geographic location), then the 
variables in the second iteration are calculated based on the first and the non-missing variables, in order to 
achieve a complete set of values for these initial conditions. In this calculation the fully imputed demographic 
variables are used as predictors for the economic variables; in the imputation of a specific wave, large part of 
information that comes from other waves is taken into account. The imputation in SHARE also allows an initial 
burn-in period in order to decrease the dependence of the chain on the initial values. Five burn-in iterations are 
used by evaluating the Gelman-Rubin criterion from the seventh iteration on. For more details see Christelis 
(2011). The imputations are estimated separately for each country (excluding Ireland) and the sample is 
representative of the above fifty population. 
13 The imputed datasets are available from SHARE at 
http://cdata8.uvt.nl/sharedatadissemination/releases/show/w2\_250/Generated+Variables/Imputations/stat
a.  
14 This is the approach most commonly followed. As robustness check we repeated the estimations for each of 
the five datasets generated after the iteration process. Results do not change significantly and are omitted for 
reason of space but available upon request.  
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We use these regressors as proxies of other-regarding preferences since we assume that 
individuals are more likely to develop such preferences when interacting with others outside 
the family or work environment. Some of these variables (voluntary and help to friends) are 
more strictly related to altruism and generosity and isolate the "sociability" component of the 
other-regarding preferences which is activated in out-of-family social contacts (Fehr, 2009). 
We speculate more on these differences in section 5. 
 
4. Econometric findings 
We estimate equations 1 and 2 with OLS clustering the standard errors at country level. 
Surveys such as SHARE are constructed in such a way that different individuals have different 
probabilities of inclusion in the sample. We use individual design weights to correct for this 
different probability of selection in the estimation.15  
For each estimation we report the adjusted R-squared, AIC and BIC statistics for model 
selection. Results are shown in Table 3, columns 1-2. Note that, despite of the huge number of 
regressors we use, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) does not reveal multicollinearity 
problems.16  
The first goal of our paper is testing for the existence of a link between life satisfaction and 
other-regarding activities as outlined in the previous section. A preliminary estimation of the 
correlation between the two phenomena provides us with two important results: i) the 
introduction of our sociability variables (Table 3, column 2-4) does not modify the coefficients 
of the baseline model (Table 3, column 1) while enriching the life satisfaction 
multidimensional concept with an invisible and very significant non-monetary component (ii) 
voluntary work, attendance of religion and political-related activities as well as helping 
friends and social/sport clubbing play a significant role explaining the variability of self-
declared life satisfaction and are all positively and significantly correlated with it.  
                                                        
15 We use the individual design weights for SHARE wave 2 (w2aci). With nonlinear estimation methods, such as 
Ordered Probit, the use of weights should be handled with care (see also Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). We 
therefore check the output of our regression for indicators of non-convergence of the likelihood function (large 
values of coefficients and standard errors or missing standard errors). All our estimates show no indication of 
non-convergence. 
16 The VIF formula is 1/(1-R2) where R2 is the R-squared obtained by regressing each independent variable on all 
other independent variables (Marquardt, 1970). If R2  is low (tends to zero) the VIF test is low (equal to one). 
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Among other controls we find that the log of household's income as well as education years 
have a positive and significant impact on self-declared life satisfaction. The same occurs for 
the number of rooms in the house, a variable which may be considered as a proxy of 
respondent's wealth, arguably better measured than self-reported income. Moreover, both 
living with a partner and being married increase life satisfaction relative to being single. 
Interestingly, larger families are associated with lower life satisfaction, presumably because of 
the lower share of gross total household income available for individuals living in households 
with many components. The number of grandchildren positively affects self-declared life 
satisfaction although the effect is not very robust to different specifications. As expected, 
health problems, captured by the objective health indices used, have a negative and significant 
impact on life satisfaction, while ageing seems to affect it positively net of health effects.17 The 
introduction of country dummies allows us to control for country fixed effects which may 
account for both country specific omitted variables affecting life satisfaction (i.e. climate, 
institutions, culture) and heterogeneity in life satisfaction scales (country bias) (see, among 
others, Clark et al., 2005). 
As it is well known the dependent variable (self-reported life satisfaction) is ordinal, so that 
its estimation would require an ordered logit or probit rather than OLS. Even though cardinal 
estimation is shown not to outperform ordinal estimation in this context18, we re-estimate 
both the baseline and augmented model presented in (1) and (2) with an ordered probit 
approach. Results are presented in columns 5-8 of Table 3 and are substantially consistent 
with those obtained with OLS in terms of significance and coefficient sign.  
Table A.1, in the Appendix, reports the marginal effects of the ordered probit model for the 0-
10 life satisfaction dependent variable and also reports the marginal effects of the probit 
model where the dependent variable equals one if life satisfaction is above median. Sociability 
has a remarkable impact increasing by 10% the probability of declaring a level of life 
satisfaction equal to 10 and by 12% the probability of declaring a level of life satisfaction 
above median. Likewise individuals engaged in at least one social activity increase by 3%  and 
4% the probability of declaring a level of life satisfaction equal to 10 and a level of life 
satisfaction above median respectively. 
                                                        
17 In our sample people are aged above 50. For this reason, the result may capture the ascending part of the U- 
shaped relationship between age and happiness (see among others Clark et al., 1996 and Frijters and Beatton, 
2008).  
18 See Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) on this point. 
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We have shown so far that other-regarding activities positively and significantly affect self-
declared life satisfaction. Hence, hypothesis i) formulated in the previous session seems to be 
empirically confirmed. In order to check for the superiority of the augmented specification 
relative to the baseline (the second hypothesis), we compare the adjusted R2, AIC and BIC 
statistics across the estimated models. We find that the introduction of the additional 
regressors both in the OLS and ordered probit estimates delivers the highest values for R2 and 
the lowest ones for AIC and BIC, confirming the superior performance of the full specification 
relative to the baseline in terms of goodness of fits.  
We want to check whether our results persist when we try to correct for measurement error 
in the dependent variable by considering different proxies of life satisfaction. We may 
reasonably assume that, when answering the standard life satisfaction question, individuals 
intuitively weight various life satisfaction sub-components (vitality, evaluation of past life, 
opportunities for the future, overall meaning of their own life, etc.). Since such averaging 
process is not simple, we may reasonably expect that the standard life satisfaction question 
has much more noise and measurement error than a latent factor which we extract using the 
answers to the above mentioned sub-components. 19 Based on these considerations we use 
the ancillary life satisfaction question of the SHARE database.20 For each item answers are 
given on a 1-4 scale with an adjective (often, sometimes, rarely, never) being matched to any 
value. We use the ancillary question in three ways. In the first, we regress the overall life 
satisfaction score on the eleven subcomponents and use the predicted dependent variable as 
dependent variable of our base estimate. In the second we simply use the unweighted average 
of the subcomponents as dependent variable. In the third we extract the first principal 
                                                        
19 A further advantage of the proposed approach is that subcomponent questions are formulated in the SHARE 
database on a 1-4 range with any of the four numbers being associated to an adjective whose meaning can be 
easily understood. On the contrary, no verbal correspondence exists for the numerical values of the standard 0-
10 life satisfaction question.  
20 The question contains the following 11 items: i) How often do you think your age prevents from doing the 
things you would like to do? ii)  How often do you feel that what happens to you is out of control? iii) How often 
do you feel left out of things? iv) How often do you feel that you can do the things that you want  to do? v) How 
often do you feel that family responsibilities prevent you from doing what you want to do? vi) How often do you 
feel that shortage of money stops you from doing the things that you want to do? vii) How often do you look 
forward to another day? viii) How often do you feel that your life has meaning? ix) How often on balance, do you 
look back to your life with a sense of happiness? x) How often do you feel full of energies these days? xi) How 
often do you fell that life is full of opportunities? 
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component of the eleven subcomponents and use it as the dependent variable of our standard 
specification.21 
As it is clear from Table A.2, reported in the Appendix, the goodness of fit of our estimates 
improves with the pseudo R-squared jumping from .18 to .33 under the best fit alternative. 
The difference in terms of BIC and AIC is also very strong (values are up to more than three 
times smaller with the alternative dependent variables). The significance of our sociability 
regressors is remarkably stable and therefore proves to be robust to the changes in the 
dependent variable. 
 
5.  Social activities,  motivations and social norms compliance. 
Econometric findings documented above identify a positive and significant nexus between 
various sociability measures and life satisfaction. Rationales for the observed findings include 
other-regarding motivations, self-regarding motivations and compliance to social norms. In 
order to discriminate among them we identify among sociability variables the two which are 
more related to altruistic behavior (voluntary/charity work, help to friends/neighbours). By 
looking at motivations for such behavior we isolate the two motivations which are more likely 
to be other-regarding (because I’m needed, to contribute to something useful) from the other 
ones (to meet friends, to earn money, to use skills or to keep fit).  Our goal is to check whether 
the interaction between participation to at least one of the two social activities more related 
to altruistic behavior with at least one other-regarding motivation (because I’m needed and/or 
to contribute to something useful) is positively correlated with life satisfaction.  
First of all, we split each of the six sociability variables into two variables, i.e. one in which 
individuals report at least one of the two other-regarding motivations and another in which 
they do not report such motivations. For the sake of clarity, in the first case, the activity 
variable is followed by the suffix “altruism”, whereas in the second by the suffix “no altruism”; 
hence we have a total of 12 motivation-interacted activity variables. We test the new 
specification with two different dependent variables. The first is the standard cognitive 
measure of subjective wellbeing (life satisfaction), the second is an eudaimonic measure of life 
                                                        
21 The first principal component accounts for 37 percent of the variability. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olin measure of 
sampling adequacy (0.76) rejects the hypothesis that the variables have too little in common to make a principal 
component analysis valuable (Keiser and Rice, 1974).  
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satisfaction represented by the consent given by survey respondents to the proposition “life is 
meaningful for me”. 
Results reported in Table 4 can be summarized as follows: 
i) Other-regarding motivations on the two activities more related to altruistic 
behavior (voluntary/charity work and provided help to friends/neighbours) affect 
positively and significantly life satisfaction. 
ii) The positive effect from the same two activities vanishes when such other-
regarding motivations are absent. 
iii) Participation to the other social activities (religious attendance, participation to 
sport or social organisations) in general positively affects life satisfaction with or 
without other regarding motivations. 
iv) Caring for a sick/disabled adult with other-regarding motivations has negative and 
significant effects on the cognitive measure of subjective wellbeing (life 
satisfaction), while positive and significant effects on the eudaimonic measure of 
subjective wellbeing (life has meaning). 
A first plausible interpretation for these findings is that individuals have heterogeneous 
preferences. Some of them have other regarding preferences which lead them to enjoy social 
activities more related to altruistic behavior (voluntary/charity work and help provided to 
friends/neighbours) but to suffer when another human being they are caring for is ill/disabled, 
deciding nonetheless to assist her/him since this choice is conferring meaning to their own 
life (eudaimonic wellbeing). In this case the negative empathetic effect produced by the 
relationship with another suffering individual is likely to be stronger than the life-enriching 
one of helping the sick/disabled and this might explain why the net effect produces a negative 
impact on life satisfaction.  
Note however that this last evidence may also be interpreted in the sense of the existence of a 
social norm which tells us that the sick/disabled have to be helped. This would give meaning 
to life even though impacting negatively upon cognitive subjective wellbeing. Hence, it is not 
possible to discriminate between these two rationales based only on this evidence. 
On the other side of our findings we have individuals who do not perform social activities or 
individuals who perform them without other-regarding motivations and, for this reason, do 
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not particularly enjoy those activities more related to altruistic behavior (voluntary/charity 
work and provided help to family/friend). 
As noted above, it is difficult to disentangle other-regarding preferences from social norms 
even though compliance to social norms does not necessarily increase life satisfaction.22 We 
try to do so by proxying the local social norm with the average share of individuals 
performing other regarding activities (voluntary/charity work and/or helping  family/friends 
in the corresponding NUTS2 area (Table 5, columns 3-4 and 7-8). We therefore re-estimate 
our model for the two subsamples of individuals living in regions where the average share of 
individuals performing other regarding activities is either above or below the sample median 
respectively.23 Our findings on the positive and significant effect of performing at least one 
other regarding activity with altruistic motivations on life satisfaction is unaltered in both 
cases. This indicates that our result is equally valid in regions where the social norm in 
performing such activities is high or low.  
We also consider the hypothesis of strategic reasons behind voluntary/charity work and 
helping friends/neighbours, e.g. the desire to improve one’s own social network or such 
activities intended as a form of apprenticeship which may increase future employment 
opportunities. Specifically, we restrict the sample to people outside the job market, i.e. retired 
individuals, in our sample. Results reported in Table 5 (columns 2 and 6) reveal that the effect 
of voluntary/charity work and/or helping friends/neighbours on life satisfaction is still 
significant although retired individuals record a higher coefficient on performing at least one 
other-regarding activity with other regarding motivations. 
 
6. Tackling endogeneity 
So far we have discussed of our results in terms of correlations. Taking causality seriously, we 
are aware that our estimates are not free of endogeneity. A reverse causal link between 
sociability and life satisfaction cannot, in fact, be ruled out (i.e. the enjoyment of high levels of 
life satisfaction may make individuals more willing to undertake social activities). In addition 
to it, when estimating the impact of social activities on life satisfaction, one might argue that 
                                                        
22 What is generally expected is that noncompliance to a social norm produces a disutility, while compliance to 
social norm does not necessarily increases life satisfaction unless the norm is interiorised.   
23 In the median region of our sample 34% of respondents perform at least one other regarding activity 
(voluntary/charity work and helping  family/friend) 
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we are ignoring unobservable third omitted factors, correlated with both (i.e. social/relational 
attitudes), which lead to overestimating the true effect of the former on the latter. In order to 
tackle these problems, we present an instrumental variable approach (IV, hereon) in this 
section and we perform a sensitivity analysis in the next section (Imbens, 2003).  
The first step for the IV estimation is the selection of the models to be instrumented. As a 
baseline model, we chose the one reported in the first column of Table 3. To account for 
possible endogeneity in the above-presented models concerning motivation and the type of 
activity, we replace the large number of variables suspected of endogeneity in Tables 3-5 with 
synthetic indicators and finally instrument them. We create two dummy variables equal to 
one if i) the individual has carried out voluntary/charity work and/or helped 
friends/neighbours (variable other reg activities), ii) the individual declared at least one of the 
two other regarding motivations (i.e. contribute to something useful or “because I am needed” 
– var. other reg mot). Finally we use the interaction term between activities and motivations 
mentioned above (var. other reg actmot).  
Table 6a reports results from OLS estimates using these synthetic indicators. In the first 
column we look at the effect of at least one other-regarding activity on life satisfaction 
restricting the sample to people who carry out at least one social activity. In the second 
column, we exclude from the analysis people who do not carry out other regarding activities. 
In both cases, regression results confirm the positive and significant impact of other-
regarding activities on life satisfaction with a larger magnitude when comparing individuals 
who do such activities vis-à-vis those who do not (column 2). In columns 3-4 we replace the 
activity dummy with the dummy capturing other regarding motivations (var. other reg mot) 
and, as in the previous case, we exclude those who do not carry out any social activity 
(column 3) and those who declare no other regarding motivations (column 4). In both cases, 
at least one other regarding motivation is associated with higher life satisfaction and the 
effect is larger when comparing those who report such motivations with those who do not 
carry out any activity (column 4). Finally, in the last three columns we examine the impact of 
the interaction between other regarding activities and motivations on life satisfaction, 
excluding alternatively those i) who do not carry out social activities (column 5), ii) who do 
not carry out other-regarding activities (column 6), and iii) who do not declare other-
regarding motivations (column 7). In all of these cases, we find a significant and positive effect 
of the interaction between at least one other regarding activity and at least one other 
regarding motivation on life satisfaction. These findings mirror previous results on the added 
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value that both other regarding activities and motivations bring to life satisfaction when 
interacted.24 
The second step consists of instrumenting the baseline OLS model reported in Table 3 
(column 1) as well as the models with all the synthetic indicators introduced above (Table 6a). 
We use internal instruments built using two versions of the endogenous variable, i.e. i) its 
average for the same region of the respondent, and ii) its average for the respondent’s 
neighbouring region exploiting the NUTS2 nomenclature. In particular, our two stage 
approach can be summarized in the following equations: 




       (3a)
 




       (3b)
 
where Wi,r  is the endogenous variable (i.e. in our case at least one, other reg activities, other 
reg mot or other reg actmot) for individual i in region r; Wr , is the first instrumental variable 
and it is defined as the average of W for region r (i.e. the region of the respondent);Wk,k≠r  is the 
second instrumental variable and is the average of W for region k ≠ r (i.e. a region different 
from that  where the respondent is living); X are the same socio-demographic controls 
described in the previous sections for individual i in region r; Ŵir are the predicted values of 
Wiri from equation 3a. To ensure instrument relevance, Wk,k≠r  is constructed by selecting the 
respondent’s neighbouring region k; in case of multiple neighbours we use a weighted average 
of Wk  for each of the k neighbours, with the weights equal to the length of the shared border.25  
We believe in the relevance of our instruments since it is reasonable to think of Wr andWk,k≠r  
as highly correlated with Wir - for instance, due to contagion, peer effects, social norms. We 
also believe in their validity, since it is plausible for Wr andWk,k≠r  to affect life satisfaction only 
                                                        
24 Ideally one would expect all the activity and motivation indicators (plus they interaction) jointly added as 
controls in a single regression. We opted to isolate the impact of these variables through sample restrictions 
because they turn out to be highly collinear and therefore would have affected the reliability of our results. Note, 
for instance, the correlation between other reg activities and other reg mot is 0.7532.  
25 See also Aslam and Corrado (2012) for the use of geographical aggregates as internal instruments.  
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through Wir and not through other unobservable variables.26 In any case, the theoretical 
relevance and validity of our instruments is supported by ad-hoc tests run after all the IV 
estimations.  
Results from the IV estimations are reported in Table 6b and support all the previous findings. 
Importantly, all the models shown in Table 6b pass the Hansen overidentification and Stock 
Yogo weak instrument tests, suggesting that our instruments are not weak (the F-statistic of 
the first stage is very high) and we cannot reject the null of overidentification validity (the p-
value of the Hansen test is always above the 0.07% threshold).27 
 
6.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
As outlined above, selection might bias our results if an unobservable trait determines both 
the involvement into social activities and life satisfaction. Unobservables of this kind can be, 
for instance, the ability of establishing social relations, personal friendliness, the degree of 
self-confidence and all other similar personality traits which may make the assumption of 
sociability exogeneity hard to support. For this reason, in addition to the previous IV 
estimations, we perform a robustness check of our results to the departure from the 
sociability-exogeneity assumption. One of the advantages of this approach with respect to IV 
is that in this case we don’t rely on instrument validity and exogeneity assumptions which are 
usually debatable (even though in our case they are supported by empirical tests).  
We implement Imbens (2003)’s sensitivity analysis which consists in modelling relaxations of 
unconfoundedness and evaluating if the assumptions necessary to determine a huge impact of 
a potential unobservable on the estimation of the average treatment effect (ATE) are realistic.  
Under this approach an unobserved covariate U can determine a bias when highly correlated 
both with treatment assignment T (in our case, the choice of implementing at least one social 
activity) and outcome Y (in our case, life satisfaction). We model the possible channels 
through which U influences T and Y leading to a bias of a fixed amount in the ATE estimation; 
                                                        
26 Notice that both Wr and Wk,k≠r  are not significant when added as additional controls in the model presented 
in Table 3, col 1. Results of this regression is omitted for reason of space but available upon request.  
27 In the IV estimates the coefficients of interests are larger than those in the OLS benchmark. This maybe due (as 
in many IV findings with similar instruments) to the fact we lose some variability in the reduced form equation 
since we instrument a variable varying at the individual level with one varying at regional level. The significance 
of the main variables seems, however, not to be affected by this problem.   
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we then use the observed X to benchmark the plausibility of the existence of such an 
unobservable.28  
The model we consider as the baseline is that reported in Table 3, column 3 in which the ATE 
(estimated under exogeneity) captures the impact of carrying out at least one activity (at least 
one activity) on life satisfaction. In Figure 3 we report the results from the general sensitivity 
analysis performed using the algorithm developed by Harada (2012). In panel A, the solid 
curve is the set of partial R2 for U that corresponds to an ATE which is the half of the baseline 
ATE; in panel B the solid curve is the set of partial R2 for U that corresponds to an ATE equal 
to 0.01 (i.e. no impact at all). Finally, in panel C the solid curve is the set of partial R2 for U 
which corresponds to an ATE no longer significant at 95% confidence level. The “+” signs are 
the partial R2 values for the X covariates of the baseline model.  
We can interpret the plots of Figure 3a as representing each of the observed controls 
according to their power to explain variation in both T (at least one activity) and Y (in this 
case, life satisfaction). In the vertical axis we report the marginal increase in the R2 from 
adding the covariate to a regression of life satisfaction on all other covariates; in the 
horizontal axis we show the marginal influence of the covariate to the variation in T. The 
curve can be interpreted as a threshold, beyond which U is so influential to reduce the 
baseline ATE by half (panel A), completely (panel B) or to make it statistically insignificant 
(panel C).  
Notice that, in all the plots, the observed covariates explain little variation in either Y or T and 
lie below the curve of U. This implies that any unobserved covariate that would be so 
correlated with T and Y to change the magnitude and significance of our baseline ATE would 
have to be much more important than all the X covariates, including gender, income, schooling 
years, household size, and age which – as outlined before – are highly correlated with life 
satisfaction. Hence, the main result from this analysis is that the ATE of carrying out at least 
one social activity on life satisfaction estimated under the assumption of exogeneity is robust 
to departures from it.  
We run the sensitivity analysis also using alternatively as T variable the interaction between 
at least one other regarding activity and at least other regarding motivation (i.e., other reg 
actmot) for the specifications reported in columns 5-7 of Table 6a. Unobservables correlated 
                                                        
28 See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Imbens (2003) for further details on this method. See Blattman and 
Annan (2010) for an application of it.   
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with both other regarding motivations and activities as well as with life satisfaction are likely 
to bias our estimates. Results are the same as for at least one activity (see Panels A-I of Figure 
3b), confirming that the ATE of the overlap between other regarding activities and 
motivations on life satisfaction is robust when we relax the unconfoundedness assumption.  
 
7. Conclusions  
In this paper we provide an empirical analysis on social activities and their motivations. We 
find that social activities are significantly and positively correlated to cognitive measures of 
subjective wellbeing (life satisfaction). As it is well known there are at least four 
interpretations for such evidence. Other regarding activities may be performed for 
compliance to social norms or for the existence of self-regarding or other-regarding 
preferences in utility functions. Alternatively, the observed correlation may be explained by 
endogeneity or by an inverse causality nexus by which satisfaction with life brings individuals 
to behave more socially.  
What we try to document in this paper is that, even though there is not just one explanation, 
the hypothesis that individuals with other regarding preferences increase their satisfaction 
with life by performing other regarding activities with other regarding motivations is not 
rejected by the data. The result is supported in standard OLS and ordered probit estimates, 
significant in IV estimates, robust to measurement error in the dependent variables and to 
relaxations of the exogeneity assumption. 
The implications of our finding in terms of behavioral economics are relevant and tell us that 
we do not have to modify our theoretical apparatus but we need to represent individual 
preferences in a more realistic way. However this does not mean that the problem of 
misrepresentation is not serious. In fact, this limit has serious consequences on the fertility of 
social and economic relationships since purely self-regarding individuals tend to create less 
value for them and for the society in social dilemmas (such as those modeled in prisoner’s 
dilemma, trust game and traveller’s game). 
Our empirical findings leave two questions open to further empirical research. First, we find 
evidence of heterogeneous motivations and we document that the impact of other regarding 
activities is conditional to the type of motivation: this suggests the existence of multiple 
equilibria with some people performing such activities with other regarding motivations and 
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enjoying them and other people performing the same activities without other regarding 
motivations and not enjoying them. The question is therefore why the second group of people 
cannot access the virtuous circle of the first group.  
Second, an original feature of our work is the focus on European individuals aged above 50. 
Future research will tell whether the same findings are cultural and age specific or do they 





Andreoni J. (1989). Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian 
Equivalence.  Journal of Political Economy, 97, pp. 1447-58. 
Andreoni, J. (1990). Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow 
Giving.  Economic Journal 100, 401, pp. 464–477.  
Andreoni, J. & B. Douglas Bernheim (2009). Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical 
and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects, Econometrica, 77(5), September, 1607-
1636. 
Andreoni, J. and Miller, J., (2002). Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the 
Rationality of Altruism,  Econometrica, 70(2), pp. 737-753. 
Aslam, A. & L. Corrado (2012). The Geography of Well-Being, The Journal of Economic 
Geography,  Volume 12, Issue 3, pp. 627-649. 
Bartolini, S. Bilancini, E. & Sarracino, F. (2009). Sociability Predicts Happiness: World-Wide  
Evidence from Time Series, Department of Economics University of Siena 579, 
Department of Economics, University of Siena. 
Bartolini, S., Bilancini, E., & Sarracino, F. (2012). Predicting the Trend of Well-Being in 
Germany: How Much Do Comparisons, Adaptation and Sociability Matter? Social 
Indicators Research, 1–23.  
Becchetti L. (2011a). Beyond Homo Economicus, AICCON working paper n.97 
Becchetti, L. & Savastano, S. (2009). The Money-Happiness Relationship in Transition 
Countries: Evidence from Albania , Aiccon working paper.  
Becchetti, L., Corrado, L., Samà, L. (2012). Inside the Life Satisfaction Blackbox, AICCON 
Working Papers 116-2012.  
Becchetti, L., Degli Antoni, G., Ottone, S. & Solferino, N. (2011c). Spectators versus 
Stakeholders with or without Veil of Ignorance: the Difference it Makes for Justice and 
Chosen Distribution Criteria, Econometica Working paper 31. 
Becchetti, L., Giachin Ricca, E. & Pelloni, A. (2011b), The 60es Turnaround as a Test on the 
Causal Relationship between Sociability and Happiness.  Social Indicators Research, forth. 
Becchetti, L., Pelloni, A. & Rossetti, F. (2008). Relational Goods, Sociability, and Happiness, 
Kyklos, 61 (3), pp. 343-363.  
 Becker, T, Carter, M. & Jörg Naeve (2005). Experts Playing the Traveler's Dilemma, 
Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität 
Hohenheim 252/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany. 
Belot, M., V. Bhaskar, J. & Van de Ven, G. (2010).  Social Preferences in the Public Arena: 
Evidence from a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game on a TV Show,  mimeo 
Ben-Ner, A. & L. Putterman (2010). Trusting, Trustworthiness, and CSR: Some Experiments 
and Implications in L. Sacconi, M. Blair, R.E. Freeman and A.Vercelli (eds.) Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Corporate Governance: The Contribution of Economic Theory and 
Related Disciplines,  Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
Berg, J. Dickhaut, J. & McCabe K. (1995), Trust, Reciprocity and Social History, Games and 
Economic Behaviour, 10, pp. 122-142. 
 24
Bilancini, E. & D'Alessandro, S. (2011). Long-run Welfare under Externalities in Consumption, 
Leisure, and Production: A Case for Happy Degrowth vs. Unhappy Growth," Center for 
Economic Research (RECent) 072, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Dept. of 
Economics. 
Binmore, K. . & Shaked, A. (2010), Experimental Economics:where next ? Rejoinder, Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 73, 120–121 
Blattman, C. & Annan, A. J. (2010). The Consequences of Child Soldiering, Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 92, pp.  882-98. 
Broberg, T., Ellingsen, T. & Johannesson M. (2007). Is Generosity Involuntary? Economics 
Letters, 94(1), pp. 32-37. 
Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press. 
Camerer, C. F. & Thaler, R. H. (1995). “Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives , 9, pp. 209-19. 
Cameron, A. C. & Trivedi, P. K.  (2005). Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Carson, R. T.,  Flores, N. E.  & Meade, N. F. (2001), Contingent Valuation: Controversies and 
Evidence, Environmental and Resource Economics, 19, pp. 173–210.  
Christelis, D.,  2011. "Imputation of Missing Data in Waves 1 and 2 of SHARE," CSEF Working 
Papers 278, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance 
Clark, A. & Lelkes, O. (2009). Let Us Pray: Religious Interactions In Life Satisfaction. Paris 
School of Economics, Working Paper 2009-01.  
Clark, A., Etilé, F., Postel-Vinay, F., Senik, C. & Van der Straeten, K. (2005). Heterogeneity in 
Reported Well-Being: Evidence from Twelve European Countries, Economic Journal, 115, 
pp.C118-C132. 
Clark, A., Oswald, A. & Warr, P. (1996). Is Job Satisfaction U-shaped in Age, Journal of 
Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 69, pp.57-81.  
Dana, J., Cain, D.M., & Dawes, R.M. (2006). What You Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Me: Costly but 
Quiet Exit in Dictator Games,  Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 100,  
pp. 193-201.  
Engel, C. (2010), Dictator Games: A Meta Study. MPI Collective Goods Preprint No. 2010/07  
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 
American Economic Review,  90, pp. 980-994. 
Fehr, E., Kirchler, E., Weichbold, A. & Gächter, S. (1998). When Social Forces Overpower 
Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets, Journal of Labor Economics, 
16, pp.  324-351. 
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G. & Riedl, A. (1993). Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An 
Experimental Investigation,  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, pp. 437-459. 
Fehr, E., (2009). On The Economics and Biology of Trust, Journal of the European Economic 
Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(2-3), pages 235-266, 04-05. 
 25
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A. & Frijters, P. (2004): How Important is Methodology for the Estimates 
of the Determinants of Happiness? The Economic Journal, 114. pp. 641-659. 
Fischbacher, U., S. Gächter & Fehr, E. (2001). Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence 
from a Public Goods Experiment, Economics Letters, 71: 397-404 
Frey, B. S. & Stutzer, A. (2000). Happiness, Economy and Institutions. The Economic Journal, 
110, pp. 918–938. 
Frey, B. S. and Stutzer, A. (2005) Beyond Outcomes: Measuring Procedural Utility. Oxford 
Economic Papers, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 90-111. 
Frijters, P. & Beatton, T. (2008): The Mystery of the U-shaped Relationship between 
Happiness and Age. NCER Working Paper Series 26, National Centre for Econometric 
Research. 
Goeree, J. K., Holt, C. A. & Laury, S. K. (2002). Private Costs and Public Benefits: Unraveling the 
Effects of Altruism and Noisy Behavior,  Journal of Public Economics, 83(2), pp. 255-76. 
Güth, W., R. Schmittberger, & B.Schwarze, (1982). An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum 
Bargaining,  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, pp. 367-88. 
Harada, M. (2012) Generalized Sensitivity Analysis, mimeo, University of Chicago. 
Harbaugh, W.T. (1998). What Do Donations Buy? A Model of Philanthropy Based on Prestige 
and Warm Glow,  Journal of Public Economics,  67, pp. 269-84. 
Imbens, Guido W. (2003). Sensitivity to Exogeneity Assumptions in Program Evaluation. 
American Economic Review,  93(2), pp. 126–132. 
Kaiser, H. &. Rice, J. (1974). Little Jiffy, Mark IV, Journal of Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, 34, 111-117. 
Konow J. (2010). Mixed Feelings: Theories of and Evidence on Giving, Journal of Public 
Economics , 94(3-4),  pp.  279-297.  
Leiderman, L. & Blejer, M. I. (1988), Modeling and Testing Ricardian Equivalence: A Survey, 
IMF Staff Papers, 35(1), pp. 1-35. 
List, J. A.  (2007). On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games, Journal of Political 
Economy,  115(3), pp. 482-493. 
Marquardt D W. (1970). Generalized Inverses, Ridge Regression, Biased Linear Estimation, 
and Nonlinear Estimation, Technometrics, 12, 591-612. 
Meier, S. & Stutzer, A. (2008). Is Volunteering Rewarding in Itself?, Economica, London School 
of Economics and Political Science, 75(297), pp. 39-59. 
Nielsen (2012). The Global Socially Conscious Consumer, accessed at 
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/reports-downloads/2012/the-global--socially-
conscious-consumer.html , The Nielsen Company , 30th July 2011. 
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New 
York: Simon & Schuster.  
Ribar, D. C. & Wilhelm, M. O. (2002). Altruistic and Joy-of-Giving Motivations in Charitable 
Behavior,  Journal of Political Economy, 110, pp. 425-57. 
Rosenbaum, P. & Rubin, D. (1983). Assessing Sensitivity to an Unobserved Binary Covariate in 
an Observational Study with Binary Outcome. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series 
B, 45(2), pp. 212–18. 
 26
Ryff, C.D. & Singer, B.H. (2006). Know Thyself and Become What You Are: A Eudaimonic 
Approach to Psychological Well-Being. Journal of Happiness Studies, 9, 13-39. 
Salamon, L. M., Wojciech Sokolowski and Associates (2004). Global civil society: Dimensions of 
the Nonprofit Sector. Bloomfield, US, Kumarian Press. 
Sonnemans, J., Schram, A.  & Offerman T. (1999). Strategic Behavior in Public Good Games – 
When Partners Drift Apart, Economics Letters, 62, pp. 35-41. 
Van Buuren S, Brand JPL, Groothuis-Oudshoorn CGM, Rubin DB (2006). Fully Conditional 






Table 1 - Variable Legend 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Female Dummy var =1 if respondent is female; =0 otherwise. 
Log income Log of household total gross income. Its value is equal to the sum over all household members of the individual-level values of: annual net income from employment and self-employment (in the previous year); Annual 
public old age/early or pre-retirement/disability pension (or sickness benefits); Annual public unemployment benefit or insurance, public survivor pension from partner; Annual war pension, private (occupational) old 
age/early retirement/disability pension, private (occupational) survivor pension from partner's job, public old age supplementary pension/public old age/public disability second pension, secondary public survivor pension 
from spouse or partner, occupational old age pension from a second and third job; Annual public and private long-term insurance payments; Annual life insurance payment, private annuity or private personal pension, 
private health insurance payment, alimony, payments from charities received; Income from rent. Values of the following household level variables are added: Annual other hhd members' net income; Annual other hhd 
members' net income from other sources; Household bank accounts, government and corporate bonds, stocks/shares; mutual funds. 
Education years Years the respondent has been in full time education 
Household size Household size. 
Age class Respondent's age class: =1  age class if respondent's age<55;=2 if  resp.'s age=[55,59]; =3 if resp.'s age=[60,64]; =4 if resp.'s age=[64,69]; =5 if resp.'s age =[69,74]; =6 if resp.'s age =[74,79]; = 7 if age>79. 
Single Dummy var =1 if respondent lives as a single. 
Number child  Respondent's numer of children (imputed as in Christelis, 2011). 
Hrooms Number of rooms in the main residence (imputed as in Christelis, 2011). 
Big city Dummy var=1 if respondent lives in a big city (imputed as in Christelis, 2011). 
Suburbs Dummy var=1 if respondent lives in suburbs or outskirts of a big city (imputed as in Christelis, 2011). 
Large town Dummy var=1 if respondent lives in a large town (imputed as in Christelis, 2011). 
Small town Dummy var=1 if respondent lives in a small town (imputed as in Christelis, 2011). 
Rural area Dummy var=1 if respondent lives in a rural area or village (imputed as in Christelis, 2011). 
Longtermill Dummy var =1 if respondent declares any long-term health problems, illness, disability or infirmity. Survey question: "Some people suffer from chronic or long-term health problems. By long-term we mean it has troubled 
you over a period of time or is likely to affect you over a period of time. Do you have any long-term health problems, illness, disability or infirmity?". 
No limited activities Dummy var=1 if  respondent has not been limited because of a health problem in activities people usally do. Survey question: "For the past six months at least, to what extent have you been limited because of a health 
problem in activities people usually do?". 
Numb illnesses It is the sum of illnesses the respondent is currently being treated for or bothered (A heart attack including myocardial infarction or coronary thrombosis or any other heart problem including congestive heart failure; High 
blood pressure or hypertension; High blood cholesterol; A stroke or cerebral vascular disease; Diabetes or high blood sugar; Chronic lung disease such as chronic bronchitis or emphysema; Asthma; Arthritis, including 
osteoarthritis, or rheumatism; Osteoporosis; Cancer or malignant tumour, including leukaemia or lymphoma, but excluding minor skin cancer; Stomach or duodenal ulcer, peptic ulcer; Parkinson disease; Cataracts; Hip 
fracture or femoral fracture; Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, organic brain syndrome, senility or any other serious memory impairment; Benign tumor). 
Lifesat Respondent's degree of life satisfaction. Survey question: "On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means completely dissatisfied and 10 means completely satisfied, how satisfied are you with your life?". 
Age no prevent Respondent’s degree of statements that have used to describe their lives or how they feel. Survey question: “How often do you think your age prevents from doing the things you would like to do ?”. For each item answers 
are given on a 1-4 scale where an adjective (often, sometimes, rarely, never) is matched to any value. 
No out control Respondent’s degree of statements that have used to describe their lives or how they feel. Survey question: “How often do you feel that what happens to you is out of control?”. For each item answers are given on a 1-4 
scale where an adjective (often, sometimes, rarely, never) is matched to any value. 
No fel left out Respondent’s degree of statements that have used to describe their lives or how they feel. Survey question: “How often do you feel left out of things ?”. For each item answers are given on a 1-4 scale where an adjective 
(often, sometimes, rarely, never) is matched to any value. 
Fred. choice Respondent’s degree of statements that have used to describe their lives or how they feel. Survey question: ”How often do you feel that you can do the things that you want to do?”.For each item answers are given on a 1-
4 scale where an adjective (often, sometimes, rarely, never) is matched to any value. 
No fam.responsibility Respondent’s degree of statements that have used to describe their lives or how they feel. Survey question: How often do you feel that family responsibilities prevent you from doing what you want to do? For each item 
answers are given on a 1-4 scale where an adjective often, sometimes, rarely, never) is matched to any value. 
No lack money Respondent’s degree of statements that have used to describe their lives or how they feel. Survey question: “How often do you feel that shortage of money stops you from doing the things that you want to do?”. For each 
item answers are given on a 1-4 scale where an adjective (often, sometimes, rarely, never) is matched to any value. 
Life meaningful Respondent’s degree of statements that have used to describe their lives or how they feel. Survey question: “How often do you feel that your life has meaning ?”. For each item answers are given on a 1-4 scale where an 









Past good Respondent’s degree of statements that have used to describe their lives or how they feel. Survey question: “How often on balance, do you look back to your life with a sense of happiness?”. For each item 
answers are given on a 1-4 scale where an adjective (often, sometimes, rarely, never) is matched to any value. 
Vitality Respondent’s degree of statements that have used to describe their lives or how they feel. Survey question: “How often do you feel full of energies these days?”. For each item answers are given on a 1-4 scale 
where an adjective (often, sometimes, rarely, never) is matched to any value. 
Opportunities Respondent’s degree of statements that have used to describe their lives or how they feel. Survey question: “How often do you fell that life is full of opportunities?”. For each item answers are given on a 1-4 
scale where an adjective (often, sometimes, rarely, never) is matched to any value. 
Voluntary Dummy var=1 if respondent has done voluntary or charity work in  the last month. 
Rel. attendance Dummy var=1 if respondent has taken part in activities of a religious organization (church, synagogue, mosque etc.) in the last month. 
Pol. participation Dummy var=1 if respondent has taken part in a political or community-related organization in the last month. 
Help to friends Dummy var=1 if respondent has provided help to friends or neighbors in the last month. 
Cared for sick Dummy var=1 if respondent has cared for a sick or disabled adult in the last month. 
Sport social Dummy var=1 if respondent has gone to a sport, social or other kind of club in the last month. 
Voluntary altruism Dummy var=1 if respondent has done voluntary or charity work in the last month and reports at least one other  regarding motivation (because I’m needed, to contribute to something useful).  
Rel. attendance altruism Dummy var=1 if respondent has taken part in activities of a religious organization and reports at least one other regarding motivation (because I’m needed and/or to contribute to something useful).  
Pol. Participation altruism Dummy var=1 if respondent has in a political or community-related organization and reports at least one other regarding motivation (because I’m needed and/or to contribute to something useful).  
Help to friends altruism Dummy var=1 if respondent has provided help to friends or neighbors in the last month and reports at least one other regarding motivation (because I’m needed and/or to contribute to something useful).  
Cared for sick altruism Dummy var=1 if respondent has cared for a sick or disabled adult in the last month and reports at least one other regarding motivation (because I’m needed and/or to contribute to something useful).  
Sport social altruism 
Dummy var=1 if respondent has has gone to a sport, social or other kind of club in the last month and reports at least one other regarding motivation (because I’m needed and/or to contribute to something 
useful).  
Voluntary no altruism Dummy var=1 if respondent has done voluntary or charity work in the last month without at least one other regarding motivation (because I’m needed and/or to contribute to something useful).  
Rel. attendance no altruism Dummy var=1 if respondent has taken part in activities of a religious organization (without at least one other regarding motivation (because I’m needed and/or to contribute to something useful).  
Pol. participation no altruism Dummy var=1 if respondent has in a political or community-related organization without at least one other regarding motivation (because I’m needed and/or to contribute to something useful).  
Help to friends no altruism Dummy var=1 if respondent has provided help to friends or neighbors in the last month without at least one other regarding motivation (because I’m needed and/or to contribute to something useful).  
Cared for sick no altruism Dummy var=1 if respondent has cared for a sick or disabled adult in the last month without at least one other regarding motivation (because I’m needed and/or to contribute to something useful).  
Sport social no altruism Dummy var=1 if respondent has has gone to a sport, social or other kind of club in the last month without at least one other regarding motivation (because I’m needed and/or to contribute to something useful).  
At least one activity Dummy var=1 if respondent has carried out at least one social activity (i.e. voluntary, rel. attendance, pol. participation, help to friends, cared for sick or spor/social). 
Sociability Sum of all the social activities carried out by the respondent stantardized by the sum of activities (equal to 6).  
Other reg activities Dummy var=1 if the respondent has carried out voluntary/charity work and/or helped friends/neighbours 
Other reg motivation Dummy var=1 if the respondent reports at least one of the two other regarding motivations (contribute to something useful or because I am needed).  
Other reg actmot Dummy var=1 if the respondents carried out other reg activities with other reg motivation  
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Table 2a. Descriptive Statistics (full sample) 
variable mean max min sd N 
lifesat 7.56 10 0 1.782 33518 
female 0.50 1 0 0.500 34415 
logincome 10.60 15.336 2.996 1.398 32991 
eduyears 10.54 25 0 4.279 33838 
household size 2.25 14 1 1.085 34415 
age 65.40 105 1 10.159 34406 
single 0.42 1 0 0.493 44190 
widowed 0.15 1 0 0.355 34389 
divorced 0.06 1 0 0.245 34389 
separated 0.01 1 0 0.101 44190 
registered partnership 0.01 1 0 0.119 34389 
married 0.71 1 0 0.454 34389 
n. of children 2.19 16 0 1.367 33280 
n. of  grand children 2.60 22 0 3.049 33280 
hrooms 3.91 25 0 1.639 33280 
bigcity 0.14 1 0 0.348 33280 
suburbs 0.16 1 0 0.361 33280 
largetown 0.19 1 0 0.393 33280 
smalltown 0.23 1 0 0.418 33280 
rural 0.28 1 0 0.447 33280 
sociability 0.12 0 1 0.166 33620 
at least one activity 0.46 1 0 0.499 33620 
voluntary 0.12 1 0 0.330 33620 
religion attendance 0.12 1 0 0.324 33620 
political participation 0.04 1 0 0.203 33620 
help to friends 0.18 1 0 0.380 33620 
cared for sick 0.07 1 0 0.263 33620 
sport/social clubs 0.20 1 0 0.399 33620 
voluntary altruism 0.08 1 0 0.280 44190 
cared for sick altruism 0.05 1 0 0.223 44190 
help to friends altruism 0.12 1 0 0.327 44190 
sport/social clubs altruism 0.13 1 0 0.336 44190 
religion attendance altruism 0.07 1 0 0.257 44190 
political participation altruism 0.02 1 0 0.142 44190 
voluntary no altruism 0.01 1 0 0.103 33620 
cared for sick no altruism 0.01 1 0 0.071 33620 
help to friends no altruism 0.01 1 0 0.119 33620 
sport/social clubs  no altruism 0.02 1 0 0.161 33620 
religion attendance no altruism 0.02 1 0 0.156 33620 
political participation no altruism 0.01 1 0 0.125 33620 
other reg activities 0.25 1 0 0.435 33620 
other reg motivation 0.32 1 0 0.469 33620 
other reg actmot 0.23 1 0 0.425 33620 
age no prevent 2.64 4 1 1.035 33610 
no out control 2.84 4 1 0.956 33444 
no feel left out 3.05 4 1 0.959 33506 
fred choice 3.23 4 1 0.885 33563 
no fam resp 3.04 4 1 0.974 33564 
no lack money 2.56 4 1 1.104 33573 
life meanining 3.56 4 1 0.719 33368 
past good 3.39 4 1 0.757 33275 
vitality 3.15 4 1 0.858 33591 
opportunities 3.10 4 1 0.871 33392 
future good 3.08 4 1 0.878 33181 
long term illness 0.47 1 0 0.499 34292 
limited activities 0.43 1 0 0.495 34293 
num. illnesses 1.09 13 0 1.396 44190 
Altruism variables: social activities performed with at least one other regarding motivation (because I’m needed, to contribute to something useful). No altruism variables: 







Table 2b. Descriptive Statistics (full sample) 
  lifesat at_least_one sociability voluntary religion att. political part. help to family cared for sick sport/social 
Denmark 8.50 0.67 0.18 0.22 0.08 0.05 0.28 0.06 0.41 
Switzerland 8.37 0.61 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.09 0.20 0.11 0.34 
Sweden 8.31 0.68 0.19 0.21 0.12 0.05 0.40 0.10 0.27 
Ireland 8.18 0.64 0.20 0.16 0.34 0.06 0.24 0.12 0.28 
Netherlands 7.93 0.63 0.19 0.27 0.13 0.04 0.24 0.11 0.33 
Germany 7.65 0.48 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.16 0.09 0.26 
Belgium 7.63 0.55 0.15 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.24 0.10 0.23 
Austria 7.63 0.41 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.17 0.08 0.18 
France 7.32 0.49 0.14 0.16 0.08 0.05 0.21 0.09 0.23 
Spain 7.27 0.21 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.07 
Italy 7.20 0.27 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.08 
Greece 7.06 0.42 0.09 0.02 0.28 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.06 
Czechia 7.03 0.33 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.13 
Poland 6.55 0.20 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.02 
 
Table 3. Determinants of life satisfaction 
Dep. Var: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
lifesat OLS OLS OLS OLS OPROBIT OPROBIT OPROBIT OPROBIT 
          
    female 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.07** 0.06** 0.07** 0.06** 
 
(0.037) (0.039) (0.041) (0.039) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) 
logincome 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
education years 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
household size -0.06** -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
2.ageclass 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 
 (0.026) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) 
3.ageclass 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (0.069) (0.067) (0.066) (0.067) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) 
4.ageclass 0.17** 0.15** 0.16** 0.16** 0.09** 0.08* 0.09** 0.09** 
 (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
5.ageclass 0.18** 0.16* 0.17** 0.17** 0.10** 0.09* 0.10** 0.10** 
 (0.070) (0.072) (0.070) (0.071) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
6.ageclass 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
 (0.069) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) 
7.ageclass 0.24** 0.26** 0.27** 0.27** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.105) (0.107) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) 
widowed 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.079) (0.074) (0.078) (0.078) (0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.041) 
divorced -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.066) (0.047) (0.049) (0.048) (0.033) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
separated 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.111) (0.113) (0.059) (0.062) (0.060) (0.062) 
registered partnership 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 
 (0.073) (0.061) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060) (0.052) (0.049) (0.050) 
married 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
n. of children 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
n. of grandchildren 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
hrooms 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 
(0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
bigcity 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.032) (0.042) (0.040) (0.041) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
suburbs -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
 
(0.041) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
largetown 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 
 
(0.048) (0.044) (0.047) (0.045) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) 
smalltown 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 





         
long term illness -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
limited activities -0.61*** -0.59*** -0.58*** -0.59*** -0.36*** -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.35*** 
 (0.053) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
numb. illnesses -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Austria 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Belgium -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.10*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Czechia -0.68*** -0.64*** -0.65*** -0.65*** -0.42*** -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.40*** 
 (0.042) (0.046) (0.041) (0.044) (0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) 
Switzerland 0.47*** 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.030) (0.032) (0.027) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) 
Spain -0.07* -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07*** -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* 
 (0.035) (0.040) (0.042) (0.041) (0.024) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
France -0.33*** -0.35*** -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.22*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.24*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Greece -0.50*** -0.52*** -0.52*** -0.50*** -0.37*** -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.37*** 
 (0.043) (0.035) (0.039) (0.040) (0.035) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033) 
Denmark 0.44*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
 (0.053) (0.055) (0.057) (0.058) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) 
Italy -0.20*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Netherlands 0.25*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Poland -0.64*** -0.60*** -0.59*** -0.59*** -0.37*** -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.34*** 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.043) (0.041) (0.031) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032) 
Sweden 0.23*** 0.16** 0.16** 0.16** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 
 (0.061) (0.070) (0.067) (0.069) (0.042) (0.048) (0.046) (0.047) 
voluntary - 0.19*** - - - 0.12*** - - 
  
(0.044) 
   
(0.031) 
  religion attendance - 0.24*** - - - 0.15*** - - 
  
(0.062) 
   
(0.040) 
  poitical act. - 0.16*** - - - 0.11*** - - 
  
(0.050) 
   
(0.035) 
  help to friends - 0.14*** - - - 0.09*** - - 
  
(0.025) 
   
(0.016) 
  cared for sick - -0.06 - - - -0.04* - - 
  
(0.035) 
   
(0.021) 
  sport/social clubs - 0.16*** - - - 0.09*** - - 
  
(0.021) 
   
(0.017) 
  at least one activity - - 0.29*** - - - 0.17*** - 
   
(0.048) 
   
(0.030) 
 sociability - - - 0.90*** - - - 0.56*** 
    
(0.157) 
   
(0.104) 
         
Observations 30,636 30,430 30,430 30,430 30,636 30,430 30,430 30,430 
Adj.  R2 0.171 0.178 0.177 0.177 - - - - 
Log-Likelihood -59421 -58753 -58772 -58771 -55870 -55268 -55293 -55287 
AIC 118867 117531 117568 117567 111763 110560 110611 110597 
BIC 118967 117631 117631 117631 111863 110660 110711 110697 
Notes: [1] Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country; [2] *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. [3] Reference categories: Age class = 50-54; Marital Status = 




Table 4. Determinants of life satisfaction: altruism  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS OLS OPROBIT OPROBIT 
 
life sat. life meaning life sat. life meaning 
         
female 0.08** 0.01 0.06** 0.03 
 
(0.039) (0.024) (0.028) (0.045) 
logincome 0.15*** 0.04*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 
 
(0.024) (0.009) (0.015) (0.020) 
education years 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) 
household size -0.05** -0.00 -0.03*** -0.00 
 
(0.018) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013) 
n. of children 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 0.05*** 
 
(0.013) (0.008) (0.006) (0.014) 
n. of grandchildren 0.01 -0.01* 0.01** -0.01* 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
hrooms 0.06*** 0.01* 0.04*** 0.03** 
 
(0.018) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012) 
bigcity 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 
 
(0.041) (0.017) (0.024) (0.026) 
suburbs -0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
 
(0.049) (0.015) (0.026) (0.031) 
largetown 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.02 
 
(0.044) (0.013) (0.028) (0.024) 
smalltown 0.05 0.00 0.03 -0.00 
 
(0.058) (0.014) (0.038) (0.024) 
long term illness -0.25*** -0.03*** -0.16*** -0.05*** 
 
(0.024) (0.009) (0.015) (0.019) 
limited activities -0.59*** -0.16*** -0.35*** -0.28*** 
 
(0.057) (0.021) (0.033) (0.033) 
numb. illnesses -0.13*** -0.04*** -0.08*** -0.06*** 
 
(0.015) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) 
voluntary altruism 0.18*** 0.07** 0.12*** 0.20*** 
 
(0.055) (0.025) (0.040) (0.045) 
cared for sick altruism -0.06 0.04*** -0.04** 0.09*** 
 
(0.034) (0.012) (0.019) (0.031) 
help to friends altruism 0.16*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.24*** 
 
(0.029) (0.022) (0.020) (0.035) 
sport/social clubs altruism 0.15*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.18*** 
 
(0.019) (0.012) (0.016) (0.021) 
religion attend altruism 0.23*** 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.24*** 
 
(0.073) (0.014) (0.049) (0.022) 
political act. altruism 0.19* 0.02 0.13** 0.08 
 
(0.088) (0.049) (0.060) (0.107) 
voluntary no altruism 0.21 -0.03 0.13 -0.02 
 
(0.124) (0.057) (0.085) (0.097) 
care for sick no altruism -0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.00 
 
(0.125) (0.042) (0.087) (0.099) 
help to friends no altruism -0.13 -0.01 -0.09** -0.06 
 
(0.076) (0.058) (0.045) (0.112) 
sport/social clubs no altruism 0.24*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.28*** 
 
(0.034) (0.031) (0.028) (0.091) 
religion attend. no altruism 0.25*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 0.18*** 
 
(0.068) (0.016) (0.044) (0.035) 
political act. no altruism 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.14 
 
(0.102) (0.051) (0.078) (0.143) 
     marital status dummies YES YES YES YES 
country dummies YES YES YES YES 
age class dummies YES YES YES YES 
     Observations 0.179 0.130 0.179 0.130 
Adj.  R2 0.179 0.130 - - 
Log-Likelihood -58747 -32332 -55260 -26165 
AIC 117518 64688 110545 52355 
BIC 117618 64788 110644 52454 
Notes: [1] Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country; [2] *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. [3] Reference categories: Age class = 50-54; Marital Status = 
Single; Area of Residence = Rural; Country = Germany. [4] All estimations include individual design weights for SHARE wave 2 (w2aci). 
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Table 5. Determinants of life satisfaction and life meaning: social norms and strategic behaviour 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
life sat life sat life sat life sat life meaning life meaning life meaning life meaning 
 
Base Retired High Norm Low Norm Base Retired High Norm Low Norm 
        
     female 0.09* 0.08 0.12 0.07* 0.01 -0.00 0.03 0.01 
 
(0.039) (0.047) (0.066) (0.034) (0.025) (0.032) (0.028) (0.029) 
logincome 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.03** 0.04** 
 
(0.024) (0.027) (0.018) (0.031) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) 
education years 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.01* 0.00 0.02*** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) 
household size -0.05** -0.03 -0.02 -0.06** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 
 
(0.018) (0.025) (0.011) (0.026) (0.007) (0.008) 0.03*** 0.03* 
n. of children 0.01 0.04* 0.12 0.07* 0.03*** 0.03*** (0.005) (0.014) 
 
(0.013) (0.022) 0.01 0.02 (0.008) (0.009) -0.01 -0.01 
n. of grandchildren 0.01 -0.00 (0.013) (0.019) -0.01* -0.01* (0.004) (0.005) 
 
(0.005) (0.006) 0.01 0.00 (0.003) (0.003) 0.01 0.01 
hrooms 0.06*** 0.05** (0.007) (0.008) 0.01* 0.01 (0.005) (0.006) 
 
(0.018) (0.018) 0.07*** 0.06** (0.005) (0.008) 0.01 -0.03 
bigcity 0.03 0.08 (0.017) (0.019) -0.01 -0.04 (0.015) (0.027) 
 
(0.041) (0.050) 0.06* -0.02 (0.017) (0.038) -0.01 0.04 
suburbs -0.04 0.10 (0.028) (0.050) 0.02 0.03* (0.028) (0.026) 
 
(0.049) (0.075) -0.11** -0.02 (0.015) (0.018) 0.02 -0.01 
largetown 0.05 0.09 (0.044) (0.089) 0.01 0.01 (0.034) (0.031) 
 
(0.044) (0.082) 0.05 0.02 (0.013) (0.022) 0.01 -0.01 
smalltown 0.05 0.14 (0.093) (0.035) 0.00 0.01 (0.033) (0.009) 
 
(0.058) (0.097) 0.04 0.03 (0.014) (0.016) -0.04*** -0.02* 
long term illness -0.25*** -0.24*** (0.091) (0.060) -0.03*** -0.03** (0.010) (0.013) 
 
(0.023) (0.047) -0.25*** -0.24*** (0.009) (0.010) -0.14*** -0.16*** 
limited activities -0.59*** -0.64*** (0.038) (0.030) -0.16*** -0.19*** (0.026) (0.036) 
 
(0.057) (0.034) -0.44*** -0.66*** (0.021) (0.027) -0.02*** -0.04*** 
numb. illnesses -0.13*** -0.12*** (0.046) (0.074) -0.04*** -0.03*** (0.005) (0.007) 
 
(0.015) (0.023) -0.11*** -0.14*** (0.005) (0.006) 0.03*** 0.03* 
other reg actmot 0.23*** 0.31*** 0.11** 0.37*** 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.10*** 0.13** 
 
(0.038) (0.044) (0.034) (0.050) (0.024) (0.029) (0.017) (0.043) 
care for sick altruism -0.06 -0.05 0.01 -0.11 0.04*** 0.04 0.02 0.07** 
 
(0.034) (0.042) (0.035) (0.060) (0.011) (0.023) (0.016) (0.027) 
sport/social clubs altruism 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.10** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.12*** 
 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.048) (0.042) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.025) 
religion attend. altruism 0.24*** 0.31*** 0.15** 0.31*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11** 0.13*** 
 
(0.075) (0.098) (0.049) (0.080) (0.014) (0.033) (0.036) (0.018) 
political act. altruism 0.20** 0.24*** 0.13 0.32** 0.02 0.06*** -0.01 0.07* 
 
(0.084) (0.070) (0.116) (0.117) (0.045) (0.019) (0.053) (0.036) 
voluntary no altruism 0.21 0.23 0.36* 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.01 
 
(0.125) (0.161) (0.166) (0.075) (0.057) (0.119) (0.080) (0.079) 
care for sick no altruism -0.04 0.13 -0.04 -0.09 0.03 0.07 0.10** -0.04 
 
(0.124) (0.214) (0.243) (0.300) (0.041) (0.080) (0.030) (0.063) 
help to friends no altruism -0.13 -0.13 -0.21 -0.10 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.00 
 
(0.079) (0.147) (0.145) (0.122) (0.058) (0.039) (0.039) (0.086) 
sport/social clubs no altruism 0.25*** 0.33*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.04 0.18*** 
 
(0.033) (0.104) (0.042) (0.039) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.017) 
religion attend. no altruism 0.25*** 0.38*** 0.14** 0.30** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 
(0.065) (0.120) (0.055) (0.106) (0.017) (0.025) (0.022) (0.018) 
political act. no altruism 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.10** 0.02 
 
(0.100) (0.115) (0.138) (0.136) (0.050) (0.047) (0.042) (0.108) 
         marital status dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
age class dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
     Observations 30,430 15,860 15,025 15,405 30,295 15,789 14,936 15,359 
Adj.  R2 0.179 0.178 0.154 0.178 0.129 0.138 0.110 0.131 
Log-Likelihood -58741 -30993 -27898 -30209 -32326 -17142 -15508 -15508 
AIC 117505 62010 55810 60433 64675 34309 31031 33119 
BIC 117605 62102 55864 60494 64775 34401 31084 33180 
Notes: [1] Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country; [2] *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. [3] Reference categories: Age class = 50-54; Marital Status = 
Single; Area of Residence = Rural; Country = Germany. [4] other reg actmot: at least one activity performed between voluntary/charity work and helping friends/neighbours 
with at least one other regarding motivation (because I’m needed, to contribute to something useful). [5]  High Norm (Low Norm) indicates whether the respondents lives in 
a region where the fraction of people doing voluntary/charity work or helping friends/neighbours is above (below) the sample average in that region. [6] All estimations 
include individual design weights for SHARE wave 2 (w2aci).  
 34
Table 6a. OLS regressions on the impact of synthetic other regarding sociability variables on life satisfaction 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
female 0.08 0.09* 0.08 0.10* 0.08 0.09* 0.10* 
 
(0.084) (0.046) (0.085) (0.045) (0.084) (0.046) (0.045) 
logincome 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 
 
(0.030) (0.026) (0.030) (0.025) (0.031) (0.026) (0.026) 
eduyears 0.02** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
hhsize -0.06* -0.05** -0.06* -0.05** -0.06* -0.05** -0.05** 
 
(0.030) (0.022) (0.030) (0.021) (0.030) (0.022) (0.021) 
nchild_imputed 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.01 0.02* 
 
(0.020) (0.013) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.013) (0.011) 
n_gchild 0.02** 0.00 0.02** 0.00 0.02** 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) 
hrooms 0.06** 0.06*** 0.06** 0.06*** 0.06** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 
(0.026) (0.016) (0.026) (0.016) (0.026) (0.016) (0.016) 
longermill -0.23*** -0.27*** -0.23*** -0.26*** -0.23*** -0.27*** -0.26*** 
 
(0.021) (0.045) (0.020) (0.038) (0.021) (0.044) (0.039) 
limitedactivities -0.38*** -0.69*** -0.38*** -0.63*** -0.38*** -0.69*** -0.63*** 
 
(0.042) (0.056) (0.041) (0.053) (0.042) (0.056) (0.052) 
numbillnesses -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.13*** 
 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) 
other reg activities 0.13*** 0.24*** 
     
 
(0.027) (0.047) 
     other reg motivation 
  
0.12** 0.27*** 
   
   
(0.044) (0.057) 
   other reg actmot 
    
0.17*** 0.26*** 0.29*** 
     
(0.029) (0.055) (0.060) 
marital status dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
area of residence dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
age class dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 14,102 19,933 14,102 23,476 14,102 19,933 23,476 
Adjusted R-squared 0.149 0.174 0.149 0.175 0.151 0.175 0.175 
Notes: [1] Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country; [2] *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. [3] Reference categories: Age class = 50-54; Marital Status = Single; Area of Residence = Rural; Country = Germany. 
[4] 1), 3) and 5) only individuals doing at least one social activity; 2) and 6) individuals doing self-regarding social activities are excluded (i.e. activities different from helping friends/neighbours or voluntary/charity work); 4) and 
7) individuals doing other regarding activities with self-regarding motivations are excluded. [5] All estimations include individual design weights for SHARE wave 2 (w2aci). 
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Table 6b. IV regressions on the impact of synthetic other regarding sociability variables on life satisfaction 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
at least one activity 0.77*** 
       
 
(0.223) 
       other reg activities 
 
0.92** 1.89*** 
     
  
(0.359) (0.530) 
     other reg motivation 
   
1.12** 0.94*** 
   
    
(0.442) (0.303) 
   other reg actmot 
     
0.85** 1.88*** 1.33*** 
      
(0.346) (0.571) (0.409) 
   
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Obs. 27,066 12,711 17,642 12,711 20,774 12,711 17,642 20,774 
Adj R2 0.169 0.100 0.097 0.085 0.161 0.116 0.106 0.141 
Instrumented var. 
at least 
one other reg activities other reg activities other reg motivation other reg motivation other reg actmot other reg actmot other reg actmot 
Weak id. test, F 146.2 39.12 33.96 35.60 78.92 40.21 30.08 44.48 
Hansen test, p 0.370 0.767 0.0851 0.581 0.0798 0.874 0.113 0.241 
Endogeneity test, p: 0.0290 0.0148 0.000743 0.0211 0.0272 0.0332 0.00188 0.00824 
Notes: [1] Robust standard errors in parentheses; [2] *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. [3] Controls are the same as for table 7a. [4] 1) full sample. 2), 4) and 6) only individuals doing at least one social activity; 3) and 7) 
individuals doing self-regarding social activities are excluded  (different from helping friends/neighbours or voluntary/charity work); 5) and 8) individuals doing other regarding social activities with self-regarding motivations are 
excluded. [5] As explained in section 6 we use two instruments. The first is the average of the same variable for the region of the respondent; the second is the average of the same variable for a region different from the 
respondent’s one (constructed by selecting the respondent’s neighbouring regions; in case of multiple neighbours we use a weighted average of the variable of interest for each of the neighbours, with the weights equal to the 
length of the shared border). [5] All estimations include individual design weights for SHARE wave 2 (w2aci).  
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Figure 1. Life Satisfaction 
 
 




Figure 3a – Sensitivity Analysis (at least one activity) 
 
 
Notes: [1] We use the ISA program for the general sensitivity analysis (GSA) developed by Hamada (2012) which is built upon Imbens (2003)’s paper. 
The GSA does not hinge on the binary distributional assumption of U as in Imbens (2003) while generating very similar results. [2] The “+” signs are the 
partial R2 values for the X covariates of the baseline model, plotted according to the additional explanatory power of the covariate for T 
(at_least_one_activity, horizontal axis) and for Y (life_sat, vertical axis); the axis measures variations in the R2 from adding that X-regressor to the 
baseline model. [3] The solid curve is the set of partial R2 for U and represents where the unobserved covariate would have enough correlation with 
both treatment and educational outcomes to modify magnitude and/or significance of the baseline ATE. [4] All estimations include individual design 
weights for SHARE wave 2 (w2aci). 
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Notes: [1] We use the ISA program for the general sensitivity analysis (GSA) developed by Hamada (2012) which is built upon Imbens (2003)’s paper. The GSA does not hinge on the binary distributional assumption of U as in 
Imbens (2003) while generating very similar results. [2] The “+” signs are the partial R2 values for the X covariates of the baseline model, plotted according to the additional explanatory power of the covariate for T (other_reg_actmot, 
horizontal axis) and for Y (life_sat, vertical axis); the axis measures variations in the R2 from adding that X-regressor to the baseline model. [3] The solid curve is the set of partial R2 for U and represents where the unobserved 
covariate would have enough correlation with both treatment and educational outcomes to modify magnitude and/or significance of the baseline ATE. [4] Panels A-C: sensitivity analysis for specification in column 5 of table 7a; Panels 
D-F: sensitivity analysis for specification in column 6 of table 7a; Panels G-I: sensitivity analysis for specification in column 7 of table 7a. [5] All estimations include individual design weights for SHARE wave 2 (w2aci).     
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Table A.1. Marginal Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES P(life sat=10) P(life sat=10) P(life sat=10) P(life sat>median) P(life sat>median) P(life sat>median) 
              
female 0.011** 0.012** 0.012** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
logincome 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
education years 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
household size -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
n. of children 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
n. of grandchildren 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
hrooms 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
bigcity 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
suburbs -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.018** -0.018** -0.017** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
largetown 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.009 0.010 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
smalltown 0.005 0.004 0.005 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
long term illness -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.048*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
limited activities -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.082*** -0.081*** -0.082*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
numb. illnesses -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
voluntary 0.022*** - - 0.028*** - - 
 
(0.006) - - (0.009) - - 
religion attendance 0.026*** - - 0.037** - - 
 
(0.008) - - (0.017) - - 
poitical participation 0.019*** - - 0.031* - - 
 
(0.007) - - (0.016) - - 
help to friends 0.017*** - - 0.023*** - - 
 
(0.003) - - (0.005) - - 
cared for sick -0.007* - - -0.006 - - 
 
(0.004) - - (0.012) - - 
sport/social clubs 0.016*** - - 0.009 - - 
 
(0.003) - - (0.009) - - 
at least one activity - 0.031*** - - 0.041*** - 
 
- (0.006) - - (0.008) - 
sociability - - 0.101*** - - 0.123*** 
 
- - (0.020) - - (0.033) 
       marital status 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
age class dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
              
Observations 30,430 30,430 30,430 30,430 30,430 30,430 
Notes: [1] Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country; [2] *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. [3] Reference categories: Age class = 50-54; Marital Status = Single; 






Table A.2. Determinants of life satisfaction (robustness check) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep var: happypred happypred avg_lifesat avg_lifesat pca pca 
              
female -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 
 
(0.050) (0.050) (0.024) (0.024) (0.091) (0.092) 
logincome 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.012) (0.012) (0.043) (0.044) 
education years 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.011) 
household size -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.08*** -0.07*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.011) 
n. of children 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.02 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.015) 
n. of grandchildren -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
hrooms 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 
 
(0.014) (0.011) (0.005) (0.004) (0.024) (0.020) 
bigcity -0.04** -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 
 
(0.020) (0.018) (0.014) (0.011) (0.046) (0.043) 
suburbs 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.06 
 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.014) (0.013) (0.055) (0.050) 
largetown -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
 
(0.037) (0.029) (0.018) (0.015) (0.075) (0.062) 
smalltown 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 
 
(0.048) (0.040) (0.029) (0.025) (0.097) (0.082) 
long term illness -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.22*** -0.22*** 
 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.011) (0.012) (0.040) (0.041) 
limited activities -0.50*** -0.49*** -0.27*** -0.26*** -1.01*** -0.99*** 
 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.025) (0.025) (0.103) (0.102) 
numb. illnesses -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.21*** -0.21*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) 






(0.012) - (0.044) 






(0.016) - (0.040) 






(0.024) - (0.113) 






(0.007) - (0.027) 






(0.014) - (0.059) 






(0.009) - (0.033) 
       marital status dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
age class dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       Observations 29,540 29,359 30,769 30,564 29,540 29,359 
Adj.  R2 0.304 0.314 0.307 0.318 0.324 0.335 
AIC 80724 79714 39959 39110 115955 114613 
BIC 80823 79813 40059 39210 116054.2 114712.2 
Notes: [1] Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country; [2] *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. [3] Reference categories: Age class = 50-54; Marital Status = Single; 
Area of Residence = Rural; Country = Germany. [3] Happypred: predicted dependent variable of the life satisfaction (lifesat) variable on the 11 life satisfaction 
subcomponents enumerated in section 4.1; [4] avg_lifesat: unweighted average of the 11 life satisfaction subcomponents; [5] pca: first principal component of the11 life 
satisfaction subcomponents. [6] All estimations include individual design weights for SHARE wave 2 (w2aci). 
 
 
